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Bates v. Dow Agrosciences: Overcoming Federal
Preemption and Giving the People a Voice
By Kim Ly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine your friend Samantha just bought a purebred Siberian
Husky and plans to enter it into the next dog show in town. One day
she turns on the television and watches the infomercial for a new flee
repellant product. She is immediately convinced that she must have
this miracle product. The next day the product arrives by mail and
she carefully reads the warning label and applies the product as
directed on her new dog. Samantha has been using this product for
the last couple of weeks, and it fails to repel flees as promised in the
infomercial. To make matters worse, she notices that her dog is
shedding all of its fur. Thus, she quickly takes the dog to the
veterinarian only to find that the miracle product contains harmful
pesticides that caused the massive fur shedding. Samantha rereads
the warning label and finds no indication of harmful side affects of
using the product. How do you think she feels? Probably the same
way that twenty-nine Texas peanut farmers felt when their crops
were damaged by the application of Strongarm, Dow Agrosciences's
newly marketed pesticide.' At that time, Strongarm had been
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as
required by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"). 2 Dow knew, or should have known, that the new
* J.D. candidate, 2007, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., 2003,
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1. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1793 (2005).
2. Id.
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pesticide should not be applied to soil with pH levels over 7.0 since it
would stunt the growth of those crops. 3 Dow failed to mention this
important piece of information on its label; thus, the farmers applied
the pesticide on their soil which had pH levels of 7.2.4 Soon after the
application of Strongarm, they noticed that their peanut crops were
severely damaged. 5 Bates, a Texas peanut farmer, informed Dow of
their intent to sue, and in response Dow filed a declaratory judgment
action.6 After several years of litigation, the Supreme Court clarified
the scope of federal preemption and ultimately ruled that FIFRA did
not preempt the farmers' state-law claims for damages. 7
This note explores the Supreme Court's ruling in Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC. Part II discusses the historical background and
procedural history of the case. 8 Part III lays out the facts of the Bates
case. 9 Part IV analyzes the majority opinion given by Justice Stevens
and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, and the opinion of Justice
Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part.'0 Part V considers
Bates's judicial, legislative and administrative impact." Part VI
concludes the discussion of the Bates decision. 12
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Regulation of Pesticides
Poisonous chemical substances known as pesticides play a major
role in our everyday lives. They are used to maintain our
environment, control weeds, minimize crop damages and improve
agriculture. 3 Although pesticides may offer various beneficial
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1804.
8. See infra notes 13-78 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 79-101 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 102-223 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 224-255 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
13. Michael Shields, Note, Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. Dowelanco: Broadening
the Preemptive Scope of FIFRA, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 521, 524 (2003). In the United
effects on productivity, one must also consider the negative aspects
of high risk of harm to humans and the environment.1 4  The
Insecticide Act of 1910 was the first federal legislation passed to
make it illegal to manufacture and sell pesticides that were
mislabeled and misbranded.' 5 In 1947 Congress repealed the 1910
Insecticide Act and replaced it with FIFRA to provide federal
regulation over pesticide licensing and labeling. 6
FIFRA requires that prior to their sale in local or foreign
commerce, all pesticides must be registered with the Secretary of
Agriculture.1 7 Given the fact that pesticides are inherently dangerous
substances, FIFRA was aimed at improving the warning labels
attached to the pesticide products.' 8 The 1947 Act set forth the basic
States alone, there are as many as 890 active ingredients registered with the EPA.
Id. (citing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), Pesticides Industry
Sales and Usage 1996 and 1997 Market Estimates 2, at
http://www.epa.gov/opprd001/factsheets/index.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
The United States consumes one quarter of the total world consumption of these
poisonous substances. Id.; see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
990 (1984). Pesticides are used as a "plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant," or
for "preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating" plant or animal pests. 7
U.S.C. § 136(u) (2000). Pesticides refer to insecticides as well as herbicides,
fungicides and other substances used to destroy and mitigate pests. U.S. E.P.A,
What is a Pesticide?, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/about/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 16, 2006).
14. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990.
15. Id. at 990 n.2.
16. Id. at 991; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000 & Supp. 2005); see, e.g.,
U.S. EPA, FIFRA Amendments of 1988, at
http://www.epa.gov/35thanniversary/topics/fifra/01.htm (last visited January 16,
2006). FIFRA is a "regulatory statute governing the marketing and use of
pesticides, fungicides, rodenticides, and other designated classes of chemicals." No
Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 604 (2d Cir. 2003).
17. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991; see also FIFRA Amendments of 1988, supra
note 16.
18. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 n.25 (2005).
Pesticides cause various health problems such as birth defects, damages to nerves
and may also cause cancer. Shields, supra note 13, at 524; see also U.S. EPA,
Pesticides and Food: What You and Your Family Need to Know,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/food/risks.htm (last visited January 16, 2006).
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minimal standards for proper labeling on registered pesticides.' 9 The
states' original power to regulate the distribution, sale, and use of
pesticides was somewhat usurped by this new federal legislation.2 °
Due to growing environmental and safety concerns, Congress
adopted several extensive amendments that greatly strengthened
FIFRA in 1972, thereby transforming it from a "labeling law into a
comprehensive regulatory statute." 21  Section 136v was added to
FIFRA, which authorized the federal government to regulate of the
uses, sale, labeling, licensing, manufacturing and distribution of
pesticides in both intrastate and interstate commerce.
22
Under the newly amended FIFRA, the Department of
Agriculture's responsibilities were delegated to the Environmental
Protection Agency to process and approve or deny registration of
pesticides. 23 The EPA was given the authority to review, cancel or
19. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991. The labels must include "directions for use;
warnings to prevent harm to people, animals, and plants; and claims made about
the efficacy of the product." Id.
20. Id. at 990 n.2. Many states regulated pesticides before these federal laws
were enacted, and they continue to do so in the face of these new laws. Id. at 990.
Pesticide is a product designed to kill insects. H. Bishop Dansby, Bates v. Dow
Argrosciences: U.S. Supreme Court Restores Sanity in Products Liability Law, 25
PESTICIDES & You 9 (2005), available at
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/dow/media/Bates-Dansby.pdf.
21. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991; see also Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v.
DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002).
22. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991. The labeling provision of section 136v
preempts any state common law duty to warn and preserves federal regulation of
labeling and packaging of pesticides. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters
& Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993).
23. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991. The EPA is a federal agency that embodies
the resources, expertise and experience necessary to regulate labeling, and ensure
that the proper warnings and directions for use are clearly communicated to the
consumer. Lawrence S. Ebner, FIFRA Preemption After Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, Toxic Law Reporter, June 9, 2005, available at
http://www.mckennacuneo.com/news-articles-display-1492.html. The EPA must
first determine if a pesticide is safe, effective and compliant with FIFRA's labeling
standards before registering the product. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991. The EPA
must register the pesticide if:
(a) its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for
it; (b) its labeling and other material required to be submitted
comply with the requirements of this subchapter; (c) it will
perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse
suspend registration if the pesticide posed a safety or environmental
hazard or if it failed to conform to any of the requirements under
FIFRA.24 The Act requires that new pesticides be registered and
existing pesticides be re-registered with the EPA before they are
distributed in the United States.25 In deciding whether to register a
certain pesticide, the EPA must first establish "whether the pesticide
would cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" by
determining if the pesticide would produce an "unreasonable risk to
man" or "human dietary risk."26 The statute further allows the EPA
effects on the environment; and (d) when used in accordance
with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not
generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
Once the EPA approves the label for the registered pesticide, the label is
considered a binding regulation on the use of that specific pesticide. Shields, supra
note 13, at 524. The 1972 Act established data-sharing provisions to streamline the
pesticide registration process and increase competition. Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985). Congress recognized a "limited
proprietary interest in data submitted to support pesticide registrations would
provide an added incentive beyond statutory patent protection for research and
development of new pesticides." Id. at 572; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-663, at 17-
18 (1977).
24. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991; see also 7 U.S.C. § 136a. If the EPA
determines that the adverse effects of the pesticide cannot be avoided, then they
will deny the registration unless the EPA decides that the benefits of registering the
product would greatly outweigh the risks of doing so. This balance of cost and
benefit is an ongoing duty in evaluating the effectiveness of a pesticide product.
See id.
25. Ronald Fein, Note, Should the EPA Regulate Under TSCA and FIFRA to
Protect Foreign Environments From Chemicals Used in the United States?, 55
STAN. L. REv. 2153, 2166 (2003); see also 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a); FIFRA
Amendments of 1988, supra note 16. The EPA conditionally registered the
pesticides but does not approve the product or its use. Perry A. Craft & Michael G.
Sheppard, Supreme Court Review: What the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004-2005
Decisions Mean to Tennessee Lawyers, 41 TENN. B.J. 16, 19 (2005).
26. Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 879 (2003) (quoting 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(5)(C)). The EPA must also analyze the social and economic cost and
benefits of the use of the pesticide when determining whether the pesticide should
be registered. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539 (D.C. Cir.
1984); see also FIFRA Amendments of 1988, supra note 16.
Spring 2006 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
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Administrator to enter into agreements with the states to enforce
FIFRA rules and regulations.27
Under the statute's labeling requirements, a label will be deemed
misbranded and, thus, will not be registered, if it contains a false or
misleading statement regarding the effectiveness of the product or
omits necessary warnings mandated by FIFRA.28 On the other hand,
if the EPA decides to register a product, the new statute provides that
they must first give notice to the public of their decision and the
reasons for doing so.29  The amended act thereby created a
registration procedure that includes public notice and participation. 30
Over time, the EPA struggled to keep up with its regulatory
duties due to inadequate resources, 31 and accordingly, in 1978,
Congress streamlined its workload by allowing the EPA to approve
pesticide labels without confirming the effectiveness of the product.32
27. Wisconsin Publ. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601 (1991). Under
FIFRA, manufacturers are required to produce records for inspection at the request
of any officer or employee of the EPA. Id.
28. Id.; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(q)(1)(A), 136(q)(1)(F) (2000); 40 C.F.R. §
156.10(a)(5)(ii) (2003). FIFRA prohibits pesticide manufacturers from mislabeling
or omitting warnings from the product labels. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(q)(1)(A),
136(q)(1)(F). The EPA confirmed that a pesticide label is the user's direction for
using pesticides safely and effectively. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(5)(ii) It contains
important information about where to use, or not use, the product, health and safety
information that should be read and understood before using a pesticide product,
and how to dispose of that product. 70 Fed. Reg. 12,276, 12,281 (Mar. 11, 2005).
29. Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1986).
30. Id. at 779.
31. FIFRA Amendments of 1988, supra note 16.
32. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1796 (2005). Basically
the EPA does not register pesticide labels based on how well a product works or
whether the product might potentially harm crops. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 125 S.
Ct. 1788 (Nov. 2004) (No. 03-388), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/3mer/1 ami/2003-0388.mer.ami.html. Due to
the overwhelming number of cases regarding trade secret protection and data
compensation, Congress decided to relieve the EPA from resolving these disputes
which were tying up the registration process. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 573 (1985). The amendments created conditional
registration procedures that basically waived certain data requirements when
registering pesticides. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779. Congress provided: In
considering an application for the registration of a pesticide, the Administrator [of
EPA] may waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy, in which event the
By allowing the EPA to waive this duty, pesticide manufacturers
became directly liable for the damages caused by their products.33
FIFRA also imposes the additional duty on manufacturers to report to
the EPA any harmftl effects which occur during or after the
registration process of the pesticide product.34 These new standards
encourage victims harmed by pesticides to bring damage actions
which, in turn, provided incentives to manufacturers to improve their
products by utilizing the utmost care in labeling, packaging and
distributing pesticides. 35
Congress defines labeling as encompassing all labels, written,
printed or graphic material which is attached to the product.36 By
strictly construing the statute, Congress wanted to ensure that FIFRA
did not provide pesticide manufacturer with full immunity from tort
liability.37 The dangers of over-enforcement of FIFRA's regulations
would impose unnecessary financial sanctions on manufacturers,
while under-enforcement would create higher safety and
environmental risks for the community at large.38 Therefore, it was
necessary for Congress to find a balance between potential liabilities
Administrator may register the pesticide without determining that the pesticide's
composition is such as to warrant proposed claims of efficacy. 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(5).
33. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1796.
34. 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.640(b)(1), 158.540 (2003). If the manufacturer gains
information or proof of harmful effects or risk to human health, crops or the
environment, they must submit this evidence to the EPA if notice of this harm is
not already provided on the labels. 40 C.F.R. 159.184(a)(1).
35. Wis. Publ. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613 (1991) (holding that
FIFRA does not automatically preempt states and localities from regulating
pesticide use, but that state laws which regulate labels fall under federal
preemption); see also Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
36. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000). The required warnings are "specified
according to the degree to which ingestion or contact with an herbicide is toxic, and
these warnings must include precautionary statements about risks posed to
humans." King v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (D.
Me. 1992) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(2)(i)(A)), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir.
1993). FIFRA's definition of labeling does not include every type of written
material attached to the pesticide at any time. Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc.
v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1802.
38. Id.
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faced by pesticide manufacturers and the potential harm caused by
pesticides that are misbranded.
B. Federal Preemption of State Common Law Claims
The number of lawsuits against pesticide manufacturers rose
sharply in the 1970s, during which time many manufacturers
unsuccessfully argued that the common law tort claims brought
against them were preempted by FIFRA. 39 The preemption doctrine
originates from the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which provides that any state law which conflicts with a
federal law is preempted by the federal law and is without effect."n A
state law may conflict with a federal law when it interferes with the
purposes or the methods by which the federal law was designed to
achieve its goals.41 In determining whether a conflict exists, courts
consider the relationship between the two conflicting laws, as they
are "interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written. 42
However, courts may not automatically infer that state laws are
preempted, especially in areas where states have traditionally
regulated, such as tort law.43
39. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1529. Many courts found against preemption
following the decision in Ferebee. 4-24 Frumer & Friedman, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 24.05(3)(b) (2005).
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824).
41. Chem. Producers & Distribs. Ass'n. v. Helliker, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1126 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494
(1987) (holding that although the Clean Water Act preempted the nuisance action
under Vermont common law, the Act did not preempt the suit in Vermont District
Court under New York law, where the New York water pollution caused the
Vermont injury).
42. Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977)). In
determining Congress's intent, the courts must analyze the expressed statutory
language and the purpose and structure of the statute. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498
U.S. 52, 56 (1990).
43. Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963)). The Supreme
Court is reluctant to find preemption of a conflicting state law where Congress is
silent on the matter. Id. at 756. Due to a presumption against preemption, the court
found that although FIFRA extended to claims based on inadequate labeling,
preemption does not cover claims for negligent testing. Id.
Federal preemption has the effect of delegating the responsibility
of ensuring product safety from the courts to the federal
administrative bodies.44  In analyzing whether a state law is
preempted, the courts must presume that a Federal Act cannot
supersede the state's historic police powers unless there is a clear and
manifest Congressional intent to do so. 4  This presumption against
preemption of a conflicting state law may be rebutted and overcome
if there is a congressional intent that there be a federal preemption of
the state law.46 Congress's intent to preempt a law "may be either
express or implied, and [preemption] is compelled whether
Congress's command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. 47  If there is an
express preemption clause in the federal statute, then the conflicting
state law will be superseded by the federal law.48 However, if there
is no express preemption clause, courts look for implied preemption
where "it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state
and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to
44. Dansby, supra note 20. Federal preemptions allow federal law and
regulation to overcome state law. Id. The federal government has power to
regulate the content of labels on pesticides, thus the federal statutes which confer
this federal authority must be analyzed to determine whether a statute preempts a
state common law claim. 1-3 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & LAND USE PRACTICE § 3.23 (2005).
45. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). In many cases
the police powers at issue are health and safety matters, which have historically
been covered by state regulations. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs.,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-716 (1985).
46. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The court must first determine the congressional
intent behind a federal statute before they can consider whether the statute
preempts the conflicting state law. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
516(1992).
47. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 56-57 (1990). If there is an express preemption
clause in a statute, the court looks to see if the conflicting state law is covered by
this preemption clause. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
48. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 598 (1991). Preemption of
conflicting state law encompasses both states which actively regulate sale and use
of registered pesticides and states which do not actively regulate those products.
Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995).
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the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress".
49
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, the Court held that the
small town's ordinance was not preempted by FIFRA because it did
not affect the labeling of pesticides.5" Rather, the ordinance simply
mandated that farmers retain a permit before applying pesticides
through aerial application. 51 Although the town's ordinance imposed
requirements which were not mandated by FIFRA or the EPA, the
Court noted that FIFRA was not a comprehensive statute by which
the federal government regulated to the exclusion of the states. 52
Rather, FIFRA allows the states to regulate pesticide use in their
territory as long as their rules are not contradictory to the regulations
under FIFRA.53
49. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). "[I]n the absence
of a clear congressional command as to pre-emption, courts may infer that the
relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of leeway to determine which
rules, regulations, or other administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect."
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 505 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985));
see also Rice, 331 U.S. at 218. Moreover, preemption may be implied if the
"federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 516.
50. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 597. The Court determined that FIFRA does not
expressly or impliedly preempt local government use permit regulations because §
136v does not intend to preempt all aspects of pesticide regulations. Id. at 615.
Mortier provided that FIFRA gives the States ample authority to supplement
federal efforts. Id. at 613. Furthermore, there is no conflict between FIFRA and
the local ordinance, and compliance with both of these laws does not pose a
physical impossibility. Id. at 599.
51. Id. at 597. Local use permit regulations are not covered under FIFRA's
preemption clause. Id. at 615.
52. Id. at 597. Congress did not intend to regulate the pesticide industry, rather
Congress recognized the States continuing role in monitoring pesticide use and
sale. Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F. Supp. 503, 510 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
53. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1797 (2005). Section
136v is silent as to whether local government may regulate pesticides, and this
alone is not sufficient to establish a Congressional intent to preempt local authority.
Mortier, 501 U.S. at 607. Local governmental units are "created as convenient
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be
entrusted to them." Id.; see also Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967).
Furthermore, section 136t(b) expressly states that the Administrator "shall
cooperate with ... any appropriate agency of any State or any political subdivision
In 1992, the controversy of whether state law claims for damages
were deemed to be "requirements" within FIFRA's preemption
clause was settled in the Cipollone case.54 This was the first major
case to deal with the preemption issue.55 The Supreme Court held
that the federal statute that required Surgeon General warnings to be
applied to all cigarette packages encompassed common law duties
which expressly preempted certain tort claims brought against the
cigarette manufacturers.56  However, courts must analyze the
particular language of a statute's preemption clause against each
common law claim asserted in order to determine if the claim is in
fact preempted.57 The Court also found that the express preemption
clause provided a "reliable indicium" of Congress's intent to preempt
thereof, in carrying out the provisions of this [Act] and in securing uniformity of
regulations." Mortier, 501 U.S. at 615. Thus, FIFRA encourages cooperation
between federal and state in regulating pesticides. Id. at 601.
54. Shields, supra note 13, at 527. According to Cipollone, the FIFRA term
"requirements" applies to both positive enactments and common law. MacDonald
v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that FIFRA
preemption does not cover non-labeling state common law claims). However,
FIFRA only preempts state laws that impose different or additional requirements,
not those that are equivalent to the requirements under FIFRA. Id. at 1025.
55. See generally Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (holding that "the term
"requirement or prohibition" in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
included common-law duties, and therefore preempted certain tort claims against
cigarette companies"). The Court also held that there was "no inherent conflict
between the federal preemption of the state warning requirement and the continued
vitality of state common law damages action" rather the "main purpose of the 1965
Act was to avoid consumer confusion by ensuring uniform labeling, a purpose
which could coexist along with state tort actions." King v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (D. Me. 1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1346 (1st
Cir. 1993). The scope of a preemption statute is determined on a "fair
understanding of congressional purpose." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
Additionally, Cipollone explains that "damage actions can be used to enforce state
regulations as effectively as other forms of preventative relief and thus damage
actions must be preempted where positive enactments are preempted." Waterview
Mgmt. Co. v. FDIC, 105 F.3d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
56. Cipollone, 505 US at 505. The Court ruled that a federal act requirement
or prohibition regulating cigarette labels encompassed common law duties and thus
preempted state tort law. Id.; See also Craft, supra note 25, at 19; Frumer &
Friedman, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 24.05c (2005); Mortier, 501 U.S. at 597.
57. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 505.
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state law claims 58 and that claims for damage awards were deemed to
be requirements under the preemption clause.5 9 However, courts still
debate over the issue of whether Congress intended FIFRA's
preemption clause to cover state law damage claims.60
Although the Cipollone case did not directly involve FIFRA, the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 incorporated similar
terminology to that under FIFRA concerning federal regulation of
warning labels. 61 The Court's decision in Cipollone swept broadly
and covered many tort claims which resulted in a big victory for
pesticide manufacturers.
Similar to the 1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, FIFRA
also contains an express preemption clause, 7 U.S.C. 136v, which
states:
(a) In general. A State may regulate the sale or use of
any federally registered pesticide or device in the
State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does
not permit any sale or use prohibited by this
subchapter. 62
(b) Uniformity. Such State shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter. 63
58. Id. at 517 (holding that Congress's enactment of a provision defining the
preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
preempted).
59. Id. at 521.
60. See, e.g., Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
61. Dansby, supra note 20. "Not even the most dedicated hair splitter could
distinguish FIFRA's preemption clause from that of the Cigarette Act." Jillson v.
Vt. Log Bldgs., 857 F. Supp. 985, 990 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing Shaw v. Dow
Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993)).
62. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000). This section directly states and confirms
Congress's intent to recognize the State's power to regulate pesticides which may
affect public health and safety. MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1023
(5th Cir. 1994).
63. Section 136v(b). This savings clause delegates limited authority to the
States to regulate the "registration, sale, sue, labeling and packaging of pesticides
sold within their borders." Chem. Producers & Distribs. Assn v. Helliker, 319 F.
Supp. 2d 1116, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
To preserve uniformity of laws regarding labeling of pesticides,
FIFRA clearly identifies that the state regulation or requirement must
fall under a labeling or packaging requirement that is "in addition to
or different from" the requirements under FIFRA in order for it to be
preempted by the federal act.64  Accordingly, State-law labeling
requirements that are consistent or equivalent to FIFRA's mislabeling
provisions are not preempted.65
In essence, FIFRA authorizes states to impose stricter regulations
on the use of registered pesticide than those imposed by the EPA
itself, as long as those regulations do not allow a sale or use which
FIFRA forbids.66 States may review pesticide warning labels to
make sure they comply with FIFRA or else they may impose state
sanctions for violating the federal law.67 States may also impose
greater registration requirements on federally registered pesticides
when facing imminent pest problems within the state, for which there
is no readily available pesticide product to combat such problems.68
However, state registration would not be allowed if the EPA has
previously vetoed, denied or cancelled such registration.69 Thus, this
64. § 136v(b); see MacDonald, 27 F.3d at 1024. Courts have recognized that
the term "requirements" under section 136v(b) encompasses both positive state
enactments as well as common law claims. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125
S. Ct. 1788, 1798 (2005). States review pesticide labels and packaging to ensure
that it complies with both federal and state requirements. Id. at 1797.
65. § 136v(b). A State regulation on pesticide use, sale and distribution which
do not affect a labeling or packing requirement would not be preempted. Bates,
125 S. Ct. at 1798. Pesticide manufacturers who violate FIFRA may not only face
penalties for violating the federal law, but may also face additional State sanctions.
Id at 1797.
66. Roberson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F. Supp. 929, 931 (W.D.
Ark. 1994). See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). Thus, FIFRA empowered states to regulate
alongside with federal law without express authorization.
67. Craft, supra note 25, at 19. State sanctions for violating FIFRA are
consistent with section 136v(b) since it prohibits additional requirements not
additional sanctions or remedies. Id. Therefore, FIFRA does not cover state tort
law. Id.
68. § 136v(c); see40 C.F.R. § 162.151(i).
69. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(1). The EPA may veto state registration that does not
have a similar composition or a similar use pattern as that of a federally registered
pesticide product, or if it possess an imminent hazard or is inconsistent with the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 7 U.S.C § 136v(c)(2); see 40 C.F.R. §
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Act balances state regulatory power with federal uniform labeling
and packaging requirements. Furthermore, since the EPA acts as the
primary administrative agency which interprets FIFRA, it would be
in a better position than the courts to determine whether "state
liability rules mirror or distort federal requirements."7
Following the Cipollone decision, federal and state courts alike
have uniformly held that FIFRA expressly preempts failure to warn
and other labeling related common law claims.7' Overall, there have
been at least one hundred documented claims filed against pesticide
manufactures within the last fifteen years which have been dismissed
as a result of federal preemption. 72
However, there still exist a few greatly criticized damage claims
which have survived federal preemption.73 Under those claims,
farmers and other pesticide victims are able to recover under state
remedies since federal law does not provide a remedy when
manufactures violate the statute. 74 Thus, pesticide manufacturers are
punished twice since they may face both federal and state sanctions if
they are found to be guilty of misbranding their products.75
162.154; 21 U.S.C. § 3489(c)(3); 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(3). Whether or not a pesticide
is essential is not a valid basis for the EPA to veto such product. 7 U.S.C §
136v(c)(2).
70. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1804.
71. Frumer, supra note 56. See also Craft, supra note 25, at 19. Congress
intended that "requirement" in § 136v(b) to refer to legislative or administrative
enactments of positive law, not state law damages actions. Frumer, supra note 56.
Prior to the Cipollone case, preemption defenses were rare, however post-Cipollone
there was a multitude of lawsuits. David C. Vladeck, Symposium: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and Devices:
Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 95, 106 (2005).
72. Dansby, supra note 20. In light of the Cipollone decision, many courts had
applied section 136v(b) preemption provision to preempt all failure to warn and
other labeling related damages claims. Id.
73. See generally Ferebee, 736 F.2d 1529; Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, 79
S.W.3d 21 (Tex. 2002) (holding that FIFRA did not preempt certain state law
claims regarding crop damage because the EPA no longer evaluates product
efficacy).
74. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801. Although FIFRA limits States' power in defining
labeling and packaging requirements, they may freely impose different or
additional remedies for farmer and other pesticide victims. Id.
75. Id
Furthermore, up until that time, courts still had not addressed the
issue of whether non-label based claims were preempted by FIFRA.76
Federal and state courts used the "effects-based" test to determine if a
non-warning claim was preempted.77 This test provided that a claim
was preempted if "one could reasonably foresee that the
manufacturer, in seeking to avoid liability for the error, would choose
to alter the product or the label."7 8 This was an issue left to the
Supreme Court to discuss in the Bates case.
III. FACTS
In Bates, the main question before the Court was whether FIFRA
section 136 preempted the farmer's state law claims for damages.79
Petitioners, twenty-nine Texas peanut farmers ("Bates") claimed that
Strongarm, a new pesticide produced by Dow, severely damaged
their crops during the growing season in the year 2000.80 Pursuant to
FIFRA, the EPA registered Strongarm two months before the product
was place on the market.8' The farmers alleged that at that time,
Dow knew or should have known that its new product would stunt
the growth of peanuts if it was used in soils that contained pH levels
over 7.0.82 However, Dow failed to warn its customers of this fact
and instead the Strongarm label recommended use of this pesticide
wherever peanuts were grown.83  Thus, the farmers unknowingly
applied Strongarm to their soils which contained pH levels of 7.2 or
76. Frumer & Friedman, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 24.05d (2005).
77. Id. § 24.05e.
78. Id § 24.05d.
79. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793.
80. Id.
81. Id. Thus, Dow was legally allowed to sell this new pesticide anywhere in
the United States. Id.
82. Id. "pH" is the acronym for potential hydrogen which represents the acidity
of the soil. Id.
83. Id. Dow verbally confirmed this representation when selling the product to
the farmers. Id.
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higher.84 The use of Strongarm subsequently led to the damage of
their peanut crops. 85
The farmers complained to Dow, and Dow later added an EPA-
approved supplemental label warning against the use of Strongarm
on soils with pH levels over 7.2.86 After many unsuccessful
negotiations, the farmers gave notice of their intent to bring a
lawsuit.87 Dow filed a declaratory judgment action against Bates in
anticipation that the farmers would sue them in state court.88 Dow
claimed that the farmers' claims were preempted by FIFRA.89
In response, Bates counterclaimed for breach of express warranty,
fraud, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"), strict liability for defective design and defective
manufacture, and negligent testing and negligent failure to warn.90
The District Court granted Dow's motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that Bates's claims either failed on state law grounds or
84. Id.
85. Id. It is typical for farms to have soils with pH levels of 7.2 or greater in
western Texas. Id. The farmers' losses in crops came to about a couple million of
dollars, according to an attorney who represented the farmers. Eric P. Martin &
David Keating, Bates, Dennis, et al. v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, July 12, 2005,
http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/000845.php. Dow argued that other
chemicals not attributed to Strongarm and the weather conditions may have
affected the farmers' crops. Id.
86. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793. These new labels were directed to farmers who
had experienced severe crop damage from the application of Strongarm. Id
87. Id. As required by the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act, plaintiff must give defendants sixty days prior notice before
bringing a lawsuit. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.505(a) (West 2002).
88. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793.
89. Id. Dow alleged that:
(1) all of petitioners' state law claims were preempted by FIFRA;
(2) petitioners' remedies were limited to the purchase pRice of
Strongarm because of a paragraph titled "Limitation of
Remedies" on the Strongarm label; and (3) petitioners' warranty
claims were barred by a "Warranty Disclaimer" paragraph on the
label.
Brief for the United States, supra note 32 at 6.
90. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793.
else they were barred by FIFRA's section 136v preemption
provision.9
1
Following the decision in the district court, the farmers appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.92 They argued that their
claims regarding Texas labeling laws, which regulated pesticide
effectiveness, were not preempted since the EPA chooses not to
review the effectiveness of the products.93 The Fifth Circuit rejected
the farmers' product effectiveness argument because under section
136v(b), the fact that the EPA does not require manufacturers to
produce efficacy information to register their product is not relevant
to the preemption issue.94 Additionally, the court held that section
136v(b) expressly preempted any state law claim where a victory
against Dow would induce them to change its product label which
would basically have the same effect as a state requirement for a
label change.95  The court also found that since Bates's fraud,
warranty, and DTPA claims were based on Dow's oral statements,
which were in essence the same as those on Strongarm's label, any
success on those claims would induce Dow to change its label to
avoid future liability.96 Moreover, the court determined that the
farmers' strict liability claims for defective design were really a
failure to warn of the dangers and thus all their claims were
preempted under FIFRA.97 Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's decision.98 However, that decision conflicted with
the EPA's view.99 In acknowledging the confusion among the
91. Id. The District Court rejected one claim on state law grounds and
dismissed the remaining claims under FIFRA's section 136v(b) provision. Id.
92. Id.
93. Martin, supra note 85.
94. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000); see also Brief for the United States, supra note
32.
95. Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 331 (5th Cir. 2003).
96. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1794.
97. Dow, 332 F.3d at 331-32.
98. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793; see Dow, 332 F.3d at 331-32; see generally
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515.
99. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1794. In 2000, the government filed an amicus curiae
brief in the California Supreme Court in which they unsuccessfully argued that
section 136v(b) does not preempt state tort actions. See Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag
Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000). The government has since reversed it's
position on the matter. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1794 n.7.
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federal and state courts as to how to rule on the FIFRA preemption
issue regarding non-labeling claims, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision.'00 The
Court held that FIFRA did not preempt the farmers' claims for
defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of
express warranty and violation of the DTPA.' 0 '
I
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Majority
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the 7-2 majority opinion for
the Court.'0 2 He began his discussion with a detailed summary of the
facts leading up to Bates's appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 10 3  He then addressed the history behind pesticide
regulation. 10 4 He explained that the States regulated the distribution
of pesticides long before the Federal government enacted the
Insecticide Act of 191005 The 1910 Act was subsequently repealed
and replaced with FIFRA in 1947 which mainly focused on
regulating, licensing, and labeling of poisonous substances. 10 6 In
1970, the EPA took over this registration process. 0 7 Two years later,
due to increasing environmental and safety concerns, Congress
amended the statute by adding section 136v and thereby transformed
100. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1793; see also Gougler v. Sirius Products, Inc., 370 F.
Supp. 2d 1185, 1196 (S.D. Ala. 2005). The Solicitor General filed an amicus
curiae brief on behalf of the United States in support of preemption of failure to
warn and other labeling related claims. Brief for the United States, supra note 32.
101. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1804.
102. Id. at 1792. Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id.
103. Id. at 1792-94. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 1794.
105. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1794. This was the Federal Government's first effort
to regulate pesticides. Id.
106. Id. FIFRA required that all pesticides sold in the United States to be
registered with the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary would register the
product if it met FIFRA's labeling requirements and was determined to be safe and
effective. Id.
107. Id
FIFRA into an all-comprehensive regulatory statute. 108 In 1978,
Congress again amended the statute by authorizing the EPA to
"register a pesticide without confirming the efficacy claims made on
its label."10 9
Following the history of the statute, Justice Stevens noted that
although FIFRA was enacted many decades ago, the Court had never
108. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984)). "As
amended, FIFRA regulated the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of pesticides;
regulated pesticides produced and sold in both intrastate and interstate commerce;
provided for review, cancellation, and suspension of registration; and gave EPA
greater enforcement authority." Id. at 1794-95. (quoting Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at
991-92). A manufacturer must first submit a proposed label and supporting data to
the EPA before they can register a pesticide. Id. at 1795 (citing 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(1)(C), (F) (2000)). The EPA will register the product if the pesticide is
effective, if it will not cause unreasonable harmful effects on humans and the
environment, and if the label satisfies FIFRA's misbranding provisions. Id. (citing
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(A), (B), (C), & (D)). Manufacturers have a continuing duty
to abide by FIFRA's labeling requirements and must report any evidence regarding
pesticide toxic effects which are not already apparent on the label's warnings. Id.
(citing § 136a(f)(2), (1); 40 C.F.R. § 159.184(a), (b) (2004)). At this time if the
EPA determines that the product is misbranded, it may stop the sale and use of the
product. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b); § 136k(a), (b)). Section 136v provides:
(a) In general. A State may regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if
and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use
prohibited by this subchapter. (b) Uniformity. Such State shall
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under
this subchapter. (c) Additional uses. (1) A State may provide
registration for additional uses of federally registered pesticides
formulated for distribution and use within that State to meet
special local needs in accord with the purposes of this subchapter
and if registration for such use has not previously been denied,
disapproved, or canceled by the Administrator. Such registration
shall be deemed registration under section 136a of this title for all
purposes of this subchapter, but shall authorize distribution and
use only within such State.
Id. at 1795-96 (quoting § 136v).
109. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1796 (quoting § 136a(c)(5)). Congress amended
FIFRA due to EPA's overwhelming task of evaluating the efficiency of the
products, which took away from its duty to determine the health and environmental
risks posed by the product. Id. Thus, manufacturers were aware of the potential
liability they faced if their products were proven to be ineffective. Id. (citing 47
Fed. Reg. 40661 (1982)).
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addressed whether FIFRA preempts tort and state common law
claims. 110  In 1991, the Court held that Congress intended for the
States to supplement federal efforts in regulating pesticides even
though there was no expressed authorization apparent in the
statute. 1 1 It was only in 1992, when the Court ruled that section
136v(b) preempted certain tort claims. 12
Against this background, Justice Stevens addressed whether
Bates's claims are preempted by section 136v(b) which provides that
"Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter." 113  The Court explained that the
statute applies to Texas because "it regulates the sale and use of
federally registered pesticides and does not permit any sales or uses
prohibited by FIFRA." 114 The Court further acknowledged that the
prohibitions in the statute only apply to "requirements.""' 5  Thus,
according to Justice Stevens, the Court of Appeals was "quite wrong"
when it assumed that an occurrence, such as a jury verdict that would
induce a manufacturer to alter its label, should qualify as a
110. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1796. There were numerous tort actions against
pesticide manufacturers well before the 1972 amendment to FIFRA, however the
manufacturer's argument on preemption of these claims were usually unsuccessful.
Id. (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
111. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613 (holding that
section 136v(b) did not preempt the town's ordinance which called for a special
permit for the aerial application of pesticides)). According to the EPA's website,
States may review pesticide labels to make certain that both federal and state
labeling rules are met, and they may also impose state sanctions when a federal
requirement is violated. Id.; see U.S. EPA, Pesticides: Evaluating Potential New
Pesticides and Uses, available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/food/risks.htm.
(last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
112. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504) (holding that
terms "requirement or prohibition" according to the Smoking Act of 1969 included
common law duties, and thus preempted specific tort claims against cigarette
manufacturers)). After Cipollone, many federal and state courts alike ruled that
section 136v(b) preempted state common law claims. Id.
113. Id. (quoting § 136v(b)). Thus, a state law that required "poison" to
appear in big red letters would overcome preemption if there exists an EPA
regulation which imposed the same labeling requirement. Id. at 1798.
114. Id. at 1798.
115. Id. Therefore, an occurrence which may motivate an optional decision
would not qualify as a requirement. Id.
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"requirement."' 16 However, the Fifth Circuit was correct in finding
that the term "requirements" included statutes, regulations, as well as
common law duties."17
Justice Stevens then explained that for a state rule to be
preempted, two conditions must be satisfied."' First, it must be a
requirement "for labeling or packaging" and second, it must impose a
requirement which is "in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter.''" Justice Stevens further said that "[r]ules
that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe products, to use
due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their
express warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do not
qualify as requirements for 'labeling or packaging."",120 In this case,
the Court determined that Bates's claims for defective manufacture,
defective design, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty
would not qualify as requirements for labeling and packaging and
thus would fail the first prong and would not be pre-empted. 121
116. Id. His position is in direct conflict with his earlier opinion in Cipollone,
where he held that "[s]tate regulation can be effectively exerted through an award
of damages as through some form of preventative relief. The obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing
conduct and controlling policy." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
117. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1798; see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 548-49 (holding that
"the phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, this
words easily encompass obligations that take the forms of common law rules").
118. Id. at 1798.
119. Id. at 1798 (citing § 136v(b)). The Court noted that these common law
rules do not require manufacturers to label or package their pesticides in any
specific manner. California Environmental Law & Land Use Practice, supra note
44.
120. Id
121. Id. at 1799. In this case, there are no common law rules that force a
manufacturer to provide an express warranty or to say anything in a specific
manner in an express warranty. Id. at 1798-99. Therefore, the warranty on
Strongarm's label is not a requirement for labeling or packaging because the
warranty merely asks that a manufacturer follow through with their contractual
duty, and thus is not preempted. Id. at 1798-99 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525-
26). The Court also noted that section 136v(b) does not apply to Bates's warranty
and fraud claims that are based on Dow's oral statements because FIFRA applies
only to "written, printed or graphic matter" that is attached to the pesticide. Id. at
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Justice Stevens then analyzed the reasoning of the court below
regarding the inducement test, also known as the effects-based test. 122
He criticized this test, which several federal and state courts have
used in determining whether a failure to warn claim was pre-
empted. 23 Justice Stevens explained that the inducement test is not
applicable to the pre-emption issue since § 136v(b) deals solely with
"requirements," and does not implicate an analysis of whether a jury
verdict would pressure a manufacturer to alter its label. 124
Accordingly, the Court defined a requirement as a "rule of law that
must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely
motivates an optional decision is not a requirement."'' 25 Moreover,
Justice Stevens stated that the fact "[t]hat §136v(b) may pre-empt
judge-made rules, as well as statutes and regulations, says nothing
about the scope of that pre-emption.' 26 Thus, he concluded that the
inducement test was overbroad and inconsistent with FIFRA, which
actually promotes state regulation of the use and sale of pesticides. 127
The Court then analyzed the remaining claims for fraud and
negligent failure to warn, which were premised on common law rules
that qualify as "'requirements for labeling or packaging."" 28 Justice
Stevens stated that these rules provide strict standards for labeling on
1798-99 n.17. Additionally, requirements based on a manufacturers agent's oral
representation would not qualify as a requirement for labeling or packaging. Id.
Moreover, the Court held that since Bates's warranty claim was not pre-empted,
then his claim under the DTPA was not pre-empted either. Id. at 1799 n. 18.
122. Id. at 1799.
123. Id
124. Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524). The Court must focus on the
elements of the common law duty, and should not apply the effects-based test (also
called the inducement test) in determining whether that state law is preempted. Id.
Justice Stevens illustrated that under § 136v(a) a state may ban a pesticide for
safety reasons, and this ban may motivate a manufacturer to alter its label. Id.
Under the inducement test, this restriction would automatically qualify as a labeling
requirement, a result the Court doubts Congress intended. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1798 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. The inducement test would pre-empt many valid design defect claims
since, if the claim were successful, it would motivate a manufacturer to change its
label to avoid future liability. Id. at 1799. See generally Wis. Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614 (1991) (noting that the section indicates what powers
have been retained by the states).
128. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1799 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v).
pesticides, and, in this case, Strongarm's label allegedly violated
these standards because it contained false representations and
inadequate warnings. 129 He acknowledged that the Court of Appeals
properly followed Cipollone 's interpretation of "requirements" that §
136v(b) encompasses not only statutes and regulations but also
common law duties.' 30  However, he noted that many courts have
made the mistake of pre-empting failure to warn claims under FIFRA
simply due to the fact that those same claims were pre-empted in
Cipollone.13 1 He stated that these courts glossed over the obvious
textual differences between FIFRA and the 1969 Smoking Act.1
32
Unlike the Cipollone pre-emption clause, 13 3 § 136v(b) specifically
targets state law labeling and packaging requirements, which are in
addition to or different from those under FIFRA. 134 Therefore, "a
state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by § 136v(b) if it is
equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA's misbranding
provisions. 135  Thus, state laws that create parallel labeling
requirements as to those under FIFRA would survive pre-emption. 136
Additionally, the Court agreed with the farmers' argument that their
fraud and failure to warn claims are not pre-empted since these state
laws are equivalent to the rules under FIFRA. 137  Moreover, the
129. Id. at 1800.
130. Id. at 1799 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (holding that the term
"requirement or prohibition" included common law rules, and thus preempted
certain common law tort claims)).
131. Id. at 1800.
132. Id. at 1800 n.21 (quoting Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 559
(9th Cir. 1995) ("[t]here is no notable difference between the language in the 1969
Cigarette Act and the language in FIFRA")); and Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994
F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Not even the most dedicated hair-splitter could
distinguish these statements.")).
133. Id. at 1800. The Smoking Act provides that "[n]o requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this [Act]" Id at 1800 n.22. (quoting
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515).
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Vladeck, supra note 71, at 106, 116.
137. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1800. FIFRA and the state laws at issue both
prohibits a label from containing "false or misleading" statements, or inadequate
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Court held that "state law need not explicitly incorporate FIFRA's
standards as an element of a cause of action in order to survive pre-
emption."'1 38
In ruling on the Bates case, the Court heavily depended on the
Medtronic decision, which supports the "parallel requirements"
interpretation of § 136v(b). 139 In that case, the Court found that the
pre-emption provision at issue did not prevent the state from
providing damages remedies for the violation of state laws when
those laws parallel federal laws. 140 Justice Stevens also mentioned
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Medtronic discussing how the
pre-emption provision "does not preclude States from imposing
different or additional remedies, but only different or additional
requirements."' 41  Justice O'Connor explained that a state claim
seeking to enforce a federal law does not in itself impose an
additional or different requirement; rather, the threat of a damages
remedy will provide manufacturers with greater incentives to comply
with the requirements. 4 2  This is consistent with the Court's
reasoning that § 136v(b) allows states to provide remedies to those
who are injured by pesticides when there are no federal remedies
available when a manufacturer violates FIFRA's labeling
requirements. 43
Justice Stevens then addressed the arguments, presented by Dow
and the United States as amicus curiae, against the parallel
requirements interpretation of § 136v(b). Dow argued that this
reading of the statute would allow juries to interpret FIFRA to their
liking thereby creating a "crazy-quilt" of anti-misbranding
instructions or warnings. Id. (citing § 136(q)(1)(A), (F), (G)). The Court of
Appeals must first determine whether these state laws are in fact equivalent to
FIFRA's misbranding requirements. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).
140. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 495).
141. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 513).
142. Id. at 1800 (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 513) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
143. Id. at 1801.
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requirements.' 44 He noted that although Dow and the Unites States
are against this reading of the statute, they failed to provide an
alternative reading of the phrase "in addition to or different from."'14 5
Instead, it appears that they would rather have the whole phrase
deleted from the statute, thereby having the statute provide that all
state laws regarding labeling would be pre-empted. 146  Justice
Stevens stated that this is obviously not what Congress intended since
it specifically added § 136v(b), which in itself is evidence of
congressional intent to distinguish between state labeling
requirements that are preempted from those that are not preempted. 147
He also acknowledged that even if Dow had provided a plausible
alternative interpretation of the § 136v(b), the Court must favor and
accept the interpretation against pre-emption.' 48 He explained that in
areas that states have traditionally regulated, federal law will not
override state law unless there is a "'clear and manifest"'
Congressional intent to do SO.149 Thus, the Court determined that the
"parallel requirements" interpretation is to be favored and accepted
since it is the only plausible reading of § 136v(b).15 °
In addition, Justice Stevens pointed out the long history of
pesticide manufacturers being sued in tort actions as evidence
144. Id. The United States joined Dow as amicus curiae arguing against the
parallel reading of the statute since Congress intended only for the EPA to interpret
FIFRA. Id. (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 32).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. According to Medtronic, the states are independent sovereigns in this
federal system, thus it is presumed that "Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state law causes of action." Id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
149. Id. (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
150. Id. The idea that FIFRA supports pre-emption of common law tort claims
that parallel FIFRA's labeling requirements is far-fetched because just five years
ago the United States advocated the parallel requirement interpretation. Id n.24.
Critics believe that another plausible reading of the statute is that "rather than
merely prohibiting state labeling requirements that differ from federal
requirements, Congress also expressly barred additional state labeling requirements
in order to entirely preclude state regulation of labeling." Ebner, supra note 23.
See also H.R. REP. No. 92-511, at 16 (1971).
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supporting the presumption against pre-emption.' 5' This history
more significantly emphasizes the importance of motivating
manufacturers to make their products safer, 5 2 especially since the
newly-amended FIFRA allowed the EPA to waive efficacy review of
new pesticides.'5 3 He also stated that if Congress wanted to deprive
the injured of state compensation and remedies, it would have
expressed that intent in a clear manner 54 because it is unlikely that
Congress wanted to give manufacturers full immunity from certain
tort liability by way of § 136v(b).' 55 Thus, the Court read the statute
in a manner that would balance out the risks for both sides because
"[o]verenforcement of FIFRA's misbranding prohibition creates a
risk of imposing unnecessary financial burdens on manufacturers;
under-enforcement creates not only financial risks for consumers, but
risks that affect their safety and the environment as well."'156
Justice Stevens then turned to the policy objections raised against
his interpretation of § 136v(b), which he found to be unpersuasive."'
He accused Dow and the United States of overestimating the statute's
uniformity and centralization.' 58 Justice Stevens pointed out that in
reality, the statute allows for a "relatively decentralized scheme" that
maintains an extensive role for state regulation of pesticides.159 More
importantly, the Court held that States have the power to ban or
restrict the use and sale of pesticides which the EPA has already
approved.160 States also can register pesticides for uses beyond those
151. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801.
152. Id. at 1802 (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613
(1991)) (holding that the goal of the 1972 amendments was to "'strengthen existing
labeling requirements and ensure that these requirements were followed in
practice"')).
153. Id
154. Id. at 1801. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251
(1984)). Given the dangerous nature of pesticides, risk of harm would be reduced
through improvement of warnings and instruction on labels, not merely through
modifying the design of the product. Id. at 1801-02 n.25.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Id at 1802.
158. Id
159. Id. (citing Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613).
160. Id. (citing § 136v(a)).
which the EPA has approved, subject to certain federal restrictions.' 6 1
Therefore, Justice Stevens urged that a literal reading of § 136v(b)
would be consistent with the federal and state powers jointly
regulating the pesticide industry. 162
The Court continued by distinguishing FIFRA from the pre-
emption provision in Cipollone. Justice Stevens believed that private
remedies that help enforce federal labeling laws would help, rather
than hinder the efforts of the statute. 163 In contrast to the cigarette
labeling law in Cipollone, which prohibited certain immutable
warning labels, FIFRA incorporates future pesticide labels which will
evolve and change as manufacturers gain additional information of
the effects of their products.' 64 Contrary to Dow's and the United
States's exaggeration of the disruptive effects of these state tort
actions to enforce the federal labeling requirements,' 65 Justice
Stevens explained that these state tort actions are necessary and
advantageous because:
By encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries
not previously recognized as traceable to pesticides
such as [the pesticide there at issue], a state tort action
of the kind under review may aid in the exposure of
new dangers associated with pesticides. Successful
actions of this sort may lead manufacturers to petition
EPA to allow more detailed labeling of their products;
alternatively, EPA itself may decide that revised labels
are required in light of the new information that has
been brought to its attention through common law
suits. In addition, the specter of damage actions may
provide manufacturers with added dynamic incentives
to continue to keep abreast of all possible injuries
stemming from use of their product so as to forestall
such actions through product improvement. 166
161. Id. (citing § 136v(c)). See also 7 U.S.C § 136w-i (2000) (authorizing
EPA to grant states primary enforcement responsibility for use violations).
162. Id.
163. Id
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541-42).
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Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that FIFRA has prohibited
inaccurate and misleading statements, representations, and warnings
ever since it was first enacted in 1947.167 On the other hand, tort
actions for failure to warn claims were prevalent well before the
creation of the statute and continued to be common well after the
1972 amendments to FIFRA. 168 Accordingly, there has been no
evidence supporting Dow's and the United States' arguments that
such tort actions have produced a "crazy-quilt" of FIFRA standards
or otherwise have burdened manufacturers or the EPA with
increasing hardships. 169  Instead, there has been evidence showing
that the EPA actually welcomed these types of tort actions.' 70 Justice
Stevens then discussed the argument concerning juries coming up
with contradictory results regarding misbranding. He noted that this
is possible, however, there is no reason to believe that this would
happen frequently or that it would cause greater difficulties for
manufacturers who face the everyday risk of contradictory jury
verdicts. 171
The Court stated that under its reading of the statute, the impact
of § 136v(b) is narrowed, however, it still retains an important role in
regulating pesticides. 172 Justice Stevens explained that § 136v(b)
primarily pre-empts competing state labeling requirements that
would produce major inefficiencies for manufacturers and the
EPA. 173 In addition, the pre-emption provision also overrides any
state law that would impose a different or additional labeling
requirement from those that are required under FIFRA and its
167. Id. at 1803.
168. Id
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id. Justice Stevens also notes that "lay juries are in no sense anathema to
FIFRA's scheme: In criminal prosecutions for violation of FIFRA's provisions, ....
juries necessarily pass on allegations of misbranding." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Court explained that competing state labeling requirements such
as "50 different labeling regimes prescribing the color, font size, and wording of
warnings" would create confusion and impose additional burdens on
manufacturers. Id. This statute satisfies the need for uniformity in the pesticide
industry. Id. n.26. Moreover, the long history of FIFRA amendments lacks any
evidence that Congress intended to abolish the common-law duties owed by
manufacturers of harmful substances. Id.
implementing laws.'74 On the other hand, Justice Stevens pointed out
that the § 136v(b) does not pre-empt state laws that are fully
consistent and equivalent with federal requirements. 75
Having settled on one definite interpretation of § 136v(b), the
Court then focused on the remaining issues of whether the statute
pre-empted the farmers' fraud and failure to warn claims.'7 6 The
Court recognized that it had not received sufficient briefing on this
matter, which primarily rests on Texas law.' 77 Thus, the Court
remanded the action to the Court of Appeals. 178 In doing so, Justice
Stevens emphasized the point that a state labeling law must be
equivalent and fully consistent with FIFRA's misbranding standards
to survive pre-emption. 7 9 Furthermore, the Court held that state
labeling rules must be measured against all relevant EPA rules that
support FIFRA's misbranding requirements.' 8' To illustrate this
point, Justice Stevens provided the example that "a failure-to-warn
claim alleging that a given pesticide's label should have stated
'DANGER' instead of the more subdued 'CAUTION' would be pre-
empted because it is inconsistent with 40 C.F.R. § 156.64 (2004),
which specifically assigns these warnings to particular classes of
pesticides based on their toxicity." 181
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Dow does not focus on whether Texas's fraud and failure to warn
claims are or are not equivalent to FIFRA's standards. Id. n.27. Instead, Dow
primarily targets the "parallel requirements" interpretation, and argues for
preemption of all state law actions, even those that expressly incorporate FIFRA's
labeling requirements. Id. Thus, because Dow did not have the benefit of this
Court's interpretation of § 136v(b), Dow should be given the opportunity to
address these issues on remand. Id.
178. Id. at 1803.
179. Id. Justice Stevens explained that if the court of appeals determined that
the Texas' law imposed a broader labeling obligation than that required under
FIFRA, then the state law claim would be preempted by § 136v(b), since it would
be imposing a requirement that is different or in addition to federal labeling
requirements. Id.
180. Id. at 1804.
181. Id. Currently there are few regulations that narrow or elaborate on
FIFRA's labeling standards. Id. n.28. In contemplating future EPA regulations,
the Court recognizes that these regulations will definitely impact the scope of the
preemption provision. Id.
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In the last section of the opinion, the Court revisited the concept
of equivalence. 182 Justice Stevens noted that in order to overcome
pre-emption, the state law requirement does not have to include the
identical language as its corresponding federal requirement. 183
Rather, if the case proceeds to trial, Justice Stevens explained that the
"court's jury instructions must ensure that nominally equivalent
labeling requirements are genuinely equivalent."' 8" Additionally, the
court should, at a defendant's request, explain to the jury the relevant
FIFRA labeling requirement, and any EPA regulation that support
and add content to the statute. 185 Moreover, the Court provided that a
manufacturer should not be liable under a state labeling law subject
to § 136v(b) pre-emption provision unless it is likewise liable under
FIFRA's misbranding standards. 186 The Court then vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.'
87
B. Concurring - Justice Breyer 's Opinion
Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion. 88 In his opinion
he primarily stressed the importance of the majority's statement that
state law requirements must "'be measured against' relevant [EPA]
regulations 'that give content to FIFRA's misbranding standards. ' 189
He compared Medtronic to the Bates case, noting that in Medtronic
the Food and Drug Administration had the power to determine the
pre-emptive effect of agency rules in light of the agency's
understanding that state rules may interfere with federal goals and
objectives. 9 ° Similarly, the EPA enjoys the same level of authority
182. Id
183. Id.
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id
187. Id.
188. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
189. Id. (quoting Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Bates, 125 S. Ct. at
1804).
190. Id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 506) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
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as the FDA.' 9' Additionally, he acknowledged that the federal
agency in charge of enforcing the statute is usually better equipped
than are the courts to decide whether state liability rules are
consistent with or contradictory to federal laws.' 92 In applying this
analysis to the case at hand, Justice Breyer explained that the EPA is
in a better position than the courts to decide "whether general state
tort liability rules simply help to expose 'new dangers associated with
pesticides,' . . .or instead bring about a counterproductive 'crazy-
quilt of anti-misbranding requirements."" 93 Moreover, he stated that
the EPA may efficiently carry out this duty within proper
administrative constraints.1 94  Thus, Justice Breyer joined the
majority opinion in emphasizing the importance of the EPA's role in
enforcing FIFRA's future requirements.1
95
C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion - Justice Thomas's Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred with the
majority opinion that the term "requirements" in section 136v(b)
encompassed common law duties for labeling or packaging of
pesticides.' 96  He also agreed that state law damages claims are
prohibited from imposing requirements "in addition to or different
from" FIFRA.1 97 He explained that although states may impose
sanctions based on a violation of FIFRA and any relevant EPA
regulations, they cannot impose liability for violation of state labeling
laws based on state standards of care.' 98 He recognized that since
191. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(1)).
192. Id.
193. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at -1804 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541 and Justice
Steven's majority opinion at 1801)).
194. Id. at 1804-05 (comparing Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 731) (stating that
"agencies can monitor the dynamic between federal and local requirements and
promulgate regulations pre-empting local legislation that interferes with federal
goals").
195. Id.
196. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. Id. (citing § 136v(b)).
198. Id. He notes that section 136v(b) allows the states to provide remedies,
but it does not allow states to change the substantive rules which govern liability
for pesticide labeling. Id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 513).
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Bates did not allege that Dow violated FIFRA's labeling
requirements, the majority properly remanded the case for the
District Court to consider the issue of whether Texas law is
equivalent to the federal standards.' 99
Justice Thomas observed that the majority omitted a major point,
namely that "[a] state-law cause of action, even if not specific to
labeling, nevertheless imposes a labeling requirement 'in addition to
or different from' FIFRA's when it attaches liability to statements on
the label that do not produce liability under FIFRA. ' '200 To clarify
this issue, he explained that these state law claims call for the
additional requirement of truthfulness to FIFRA's rule prohibiting
labeling statements from being "false or misleading."20' Justice
Thomas proffered that this is the missing step in the majority's
discussion as to why the fraud claims are properly remanded to the
lower court.20 2
In omitting this crucial step, the majority failed to properly rule
on two of the farmers' claims.20 3 To begin with, Justice Thomas
believed that the farmers' breach of warranty claims should have
been remanded for proper preemption analysis.20 4 Contrary to the
majority's opinion, Justice Thomas felt that state law is preempted in
a situation such as when Texas's law of warranty imposes liability
for misbranding, where FIFRA under the same circumstances would
not impose such liability. 2 5 As for the second claim, he stated that
the majority mistakenly held that Bates's cause of action for the
violation of the DTPA was not preempted since it is really a breach
of warranty claim.20 6 Justice Thomas claimed that the majority failed
to recognize that the DTPA claim could also be interpreted as a claim
for false or misleading representation on the pesticide label.20 7
199. Id. at 1805. The farmer's counterclaim disclaims that Dow violated the
provisions under FIFRA. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing § 136(q)(1)(A)).
202. Id. The fraud claims are remanded to the lower court to determine if the
state and federal requirements for misbranding liability are the same. Id.
203. Id
204. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1805.
205. Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 551).
206. Id
207. Id
Accordingly, he acknowledged that all aspects of the DTPA cause of
action should be remanded, since this claim should be preempted
because it imposes liability for misbranding where FIFRA would not
impose such liability.2 °8
Justice Thomas continued by noting that Bates had not yet
brought a failure to warn claim.20 9 Rather, the Fifth Circuit had
treated Bates's claims for defective design and manufacture and for
negligent testing as "disguised claims for failure to warn. "210 Thus,
Justice Thomas urged the majority to recognize that if Bates fails to
provide evidence on remand that Dow erred in the design,
manufacture or testing of Strongarm pesticide, these claims will
automatically fail on their merits. 211
Aside from the issues discussed above, Justice Thomas provided
that the analysis is complete since section 136v(b) clearly states that
FIFRA preempts certain state law claims.212 He felt that it was
unnecessary and unpersuasive for the majority to argue against
preemption, thereby favoring State regulation over federal law.2 13 He
observed that because Congress intended to include an express
preemption provision in FIFRA, the majority statement encouraging
an interpretation against preemption is inapplicable. 214 Therefore, he
stated that the Court's main objective should be to figure out which
state law claims are preempted by section 136v(b) without sliding the
scale in favor of either the states or the federal government.215
He also felt that the history of tort actions against pesticide
manufacturers was irrelevant in ruling on Bates's claims since there
is no way of knowing if FIFRA actually followed or diverged from
the tradition simply by looking at the text of section 136v(b).216
Even so, the majority argued that Congress must have intended to
preserve state tort actions because this history does not indicate that
208. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1805.
209. Id. at 1806.
210. Id. (quoting Dow, 332 F.3d at 332-33).
211. Id
212. Id
213. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1806.
214. Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 545-46).
215. Id
216. Id
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Congress intended to preempt these actions.217 He continued by
stating that the Court is not satisfied with a preemption provision, and
Congress must either "speak with added specificity in the statute" or
there must be clear congressional preference for preemption in the
legislative record to overcome the presumption against
preemption. 218 However, contrary to the Court's prior statements, the
majority argued that section 136v(b) alone is sufficient evidence that
Congress intended to abrogate various state claims. 219 Furthermore,
Justice Thomas observed that Congress, not the Court, wields the
power to authorize additional state law remedies to help enforce
FIFRA's requirements, and to mediate between state tort actions and
federal laws.220
Justice Thomas explained that the main issue at hand is to
determine the meaning of section 136v(b); thus, he agreed that the
majority properly declined to address the argument as to whether
Bates's claims are subject to other preemption statutes.221  He
concluded his opinion by stating that the majority's decision is
consistent with the "Court's increasing reluctance to expand federal
statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied pre-
emption" 222 which proves that the preemption analysis is not "[a]
freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension
217. Id. (citing majority opinion at 1803; Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1752 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's reliance on silence in
the legislative history); Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460,
472 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
218. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1806.
219. Id.
220. Id
221. Id. He argues that there is no reason for the majority to indulge in a
discussion as to whether FIFRA's standards are exceedingly persuasive or
dominant such that they would override State power to create additional remedies,
or "whether enforcement of state-law labeling claims would 'stan[d] as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress's in enacting FIFRA." Id. at 1807 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
222. Id. at 1807 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
with federal objectives ... but an inquiry into whether the ordinary
meanings of state and federal law conflict. 223
V. IMPACT
The ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Bates
remains to be seen since there are several issues that have been
remanded and thus remain unresolved. Nonetheless, the overall
decision has a broad impact on the general population, pesticide
consumers, the pesticide industry, and state and federal courts alike.
Since the majority opinion has signaled a shift away from federal
preemption of state tort claims,224 this will trigger a chain reaction
affecting everyone who uses, produces and manages pesticides. The
Court's decision will open the gates to an increased amount of
pesticide injury related lawsuits, which will affect how manufacturers
produce their pesticides and how the EPA will regulate pesticide
labeling and distribution.
In determining the true meaning and scope of FIFRA's
preemption provision section 136v(b), advocates have claimed that
the Bates Court has provided greater clarity as to the balance of
power between the federal and state government in regulating the
pesticide industry. However, on the other hand, some critics claim
that Bates is not deserving of landmark status since the lower court
will be left to untangle the many inconsistencies that infect the
decision.225 They argue that "neither the pesticide industry nor anti-
pesticide militants and their trial lawyer allies obtained the clear-cut
ruling that they sought regarding the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act's preemptive scope. 226  Nevertheless, this
223. Id (citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
224. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801.
225. Ebner, supra note 23.
226. Id. Only three weeks before the Bates decision, a federal district judge
provided that "many commentators believe these post-Cipollone cases did little to
cure the confusion ... Justices Blackmun and Scalia predicted that the plurality
opinion in Cipollone would engender." Id. (citing In re Welding Fume Prod. Liab.
Litig., 364 F.Supp.2d 669, 681 (N.D. Ohio 2005)). Rather than providing guidance
and clarifying the preemption issue, the Bates decision seems to have added to the
overall confusion that surrounds this issue.
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decision undeniably provides a greater foundation for the application
of section 136v(b) to state common-law claims.
A. Defining the Preemption Provision
The Bates Court provided two additional factors to the process of
determining whether a state statute is preempted by FIFRA.227 First,
the majority focused on the history of tort actions against pesticide
manufacturers as supporting evidence that the farmers' claims were
not preempted under FIFRA. According to the Court this history is
significant because it provides support for the idea that if Congress
had intended to deprive those injured by pesticides the right to
compensation or to provide full immunity to pesticide manufacturers
from certain tort actions, it would have clearly made this intent
known.22 8 Additionally, this long history emphasizes the importance
of motivating manufacturers to increase their efforts in producing
reasonably safe pesticides for consumer use, since the 1972
amendment's primary objective was essentially to enhance existing
labeling standards while ensuring that these rules were followed in
practice.229
Second, the Court focused on the policy objections regarding
common law tort claims. The Court recognized the need for the
states' tort actions and state involvement to help enforce FIFRA's
labeling and packaging rules and regulations.23 °  The majority
explained that these two factors would ultimately benefit pesticide
consumers and motivate the EPA and manufacturers to improve
pesticide products.23 This is especially important in the face of the
many mistakes and irreversible damage that have been caused by
pesticides in the past. Inadequate warning labels have and may
continue to lead to devastating events such as the near extinction of
the American bald eagle due to the pesticide DDT; persistent organic
227. Vladeck, supra note 71, at 106, 117.
228. Id; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
229. Id; see Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613 (1991);
Dansby, supra note 20.
230. Id
231. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1802.
pesticides found in sea animals and human breast milk; and
pesticides contaminating millions of American homes.
232
Consequently, tort actions and state regulations which comport to
federal law would aid the functioning of FIFRA.233
This decision allows for the preservation of uniformity in labeling
standards, while also maintaining that states may, without express
authorization, supplement the EPA's efforts in regulating
pesticides.234  Bates was the perfect opportunity for the Court "to
return the civil litigation system to its traditional role of responding
to societal needs in a complex, rapacious, and competitive world.
235
On the other hand, critics believe that the decision is full of
inconsistencies and fails to provide clear guidelines for the lower
courts. They claim that Bates mischaracterizes FIFRA as "a
relatively obscure provision ' 236 when in reality it has been a "long-
standing cornerstone of the federal-state pesticide regulatory
scheme., 23' The Court also fails to recognize Congress's intent "[i]n
dividing the responsibility between the States and the Federal
Government for the management of an effective pesticide program..
to completely preempt State authority in regard to labeling.,
231
Then turning to the lower court's task of determining whether a
failure to warn claim imposes requirements which actually parallel
federal requirements, critics claim that this process involves a great
deal more than a simple comparison between the elements of a state
claim and the text of FIFRA's provisions.239 Critics conclude that the
232. Dansby, supra note 20.
233. Id
234. Craft, supra note 25, at 19. FIFRA reserves for the states some regulatory
powers while mandating nationwide uniformity in the labeling and packaging of
pesticides. Shields, supra note 13, at 524. This uniformity allows for the interstate
trading of pesticides. Id.
235. Dansby, supra note 20.
236. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1802.
237. Ebner, supra note 23.
238. H.R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 16 (1971).
239. Ebner, supra note 23. In a situation where a person's hair fell out after
the use of a certain pesticide, the court would have to determine if the omission of
the warning on the label was necessary and whether the person had
credible scientific evidence to support his claim that the
pesticide caused his hair to fall out; whether the manufacturer
was aware of any such scientific evidence; and whether EPA, if
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Bates decision greatly increased the burden on pesticide
manufacturers to boost their efforts to protect themselves from
product liability and damages suits. 240  Despite the fact that
manufacturers may face greater challenges, pesticide consumers and
the environment will actually benefit from this added effort to
improve pesticide products.
B. Narrowing the Scope of FIFRA Preemption
The most evident judicial impact of the Bates ruling is that this
decision narrowed the Cipollone decision regarding the application of
preemption to common law claims.241 Before the ruling in Bates, the
California Supreme Court ruled that FIFRA expressly preempted
state law actions premised on failure to warn.2 42 Unlike Cipollone
and other previous decisions, the Bates Court maintains that section
136v(b) should be interpreted narrowly since it only applies to state
regulation of pesticide labels.243 The Court recognized that, although
common law duties may qualify as "requirements," this does not
automatically preempt all tort claims premised on common law
duties.244
Additionally, before a state claim may properly be preempted, the
Court demands a further inquiry as to whether these state common
law rules are "in addition to or different from" the labeling
aware of such evidence, would have required a warning on the
product's labeling regarding the risk to a user's hair. Id.
240. Id
241. Craft, supra note 25, at 19. If a plaintiff brought an action for negligent
design because they were harmed by the product even through they used it
according to the label, the court would preempt the claim and rule the action as
failure to warn claim. Dansby, supra note 20. Thus, products could be deemed
legal and harmful even if used as directed. Id. However, the Bates decision
changed this ruling as to harmful products such as pesticides. Id. Additionally,
following the Cipollone decision, "farmers [were] not allowed to bring suit when
their crops [were] damaged by a product, it allow[ed] and it license[d] these
companies to use farmers as their guinea pigs." Martin, supra note 85.
242. CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & LAND USE PRACTICE, supra note
44.
243. Dansby, supra note 20.
244. Vladeck, supra note 71, at 106.
requirements under FIFRA. 245 Accordingly, it remains to be seen
whether the Fifth Circuit determines that the farmers' fraud and
failure to warn claims are in fact equivalent to, or whether they
diverge from FIFRA's misbranding provision, thereby resolving the
preemption issue regarding those claims. 246  Thus, the two major
revelations of the Bates decision are: (1) there is no need for the state
regulation to expressly incorporate FIFRA's standards as an element
of a claim to survive preemption 247 and (2) a state labeling
requirement will overcome preemption if it is in fact equivalent to
and fully consistent with FIFRA's labeling standards.248
Consequently, some failure to warn claims will survive preemption if
it parallels the requirements imposed under FIFRA.249
C. Impact on Health and Safety
In declaring a trend away from preemption, the Court ruled that
farmers and others who are injured by pesticides are once again250
able to bring common law tort claims against pesticide
manufacturers. 251 Federal regulations such as FIFRA were originally
created "to protect the public welfare by enforcing uniform standards
for pesticide labeling, allowing the public to make informed
decisions as to the risks associated with pesticides and the steps they
can take to protect themselves. 252  Thus, the Bates decision is
entirely consistent with Congress's objective of protecting consumers
from dangerous pesticide products.25 3 Moreover, the ruling provides
greater incentives for manufacturers to be truthful when registering
their pesticide labels. 25 4 All in all, the benefit of increased safety and
245. Id.
246. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1803.
247. Id. at 1805.
248. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1803.
249. Dansby, supra note 20.
250. Id. Prior to Cipollone, pesticide manufacturers were exposed to common
law tort actions. Id.
251. Id
252. Shields, supra note 13, at 524; see, e.g., S. Rep. 92-838 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.C. 1359.
253. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1794.
254. Shields, supra note 13, at 524; see, e.g., S. Rep. 92-838.
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health measures in the pesticide industry will outweigh any burdens
which manufacturers must face.
D. The EPA's Scope of Authority
In Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, he stressed that the
federal administrative agency, in this case the EPA, is in a superior
position than the courts to determine whether a state regulation
actually parallels or distorts federal provisions.255 Hence, although
the issue of whether the farmers' claims for fraud and failure to warn
were remanded to the lower courts, the EPA may have the final say
as to whether these claims are indeed preempted by FIFRA.
Consequently, the Bates decision has enhanced the scope of the
EPA's authority by recognizing its' experience in dealing with these
types of matters.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Bates when taken as a whole
will have a tremendous impact on past and future administrative law.
This ruling will affect how administrative agencies, such as the EPA,
manage, administer and enforce pesticide regulations. However, the
EPA's power over this regulatory field may have been somewhat
constricted after Bates, since the majority opinion has clearly
established and recognized the states' power to supplement the
EPA's efforts when regulating the use and distribution of pesticides.
On the other hand, although the states may compliment the EPA's
efforts, the Court made it clear that it is the EPA who will have the
last word as to whether state regulations actually mirror or distort
federal requirements.
Before the Bates decision, people who were injured by pesticides
had no opportunity to recover from pesticide manufacturers since
their common law claims were deemed to be preempted under
section 136v(b). However, the Bates Court has signaled a shift away
and against federal preemption of common law tort actions.
Consequently, access to long available compensation and state
255. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1804.
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remedies has been restored to consumers such as Samantha256,
farmers and utility companies 257 who have wrongly been injured by
harmful substances. By shedding light on the importance of the
history of tort litigation against pesticide manufacturers, the Court
highlighted the evidence favoring the interpretation against federal
preemption. As a result, this ruling has significantly increased the
autonomy of state agencies to regulate pesticide within their
boarders, thereby paving the way for limiting the scope and reach of
federal regulatory powers.
256. See supra Section I.
257. U.S. EPA, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
http://www.epa.gov/35thanniversary/topics/fifra/01.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
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